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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT W ADKINS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Case No. 19170 
VS. 
THE DIVISION OF ST A TE LANDS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Respondent 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for a declaratory judgment that a mineral lease 
appellant entered into with the Division of State Lands is valid and in full 
force and effect, despite the Division's attempted cancellation of the lease. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After hearing cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held that 
appellant had not protested the cancellation actions within the time required 
by 65-1-9( 2) Utah Code Annotated 1953, and had failed to comply with the 
notice, filing of claim, and cost bond provisions of the Governmental Immunity 
Act (Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Code Annotated 1953). Respondent's motion 




RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment <>f th<' tn;.il c<>urt and r~mdnd 
to the trial court for entry of a decL11·;it"rv JUdgm<°lll I<> tht df,., t thnt th" 
lease entered into between appellant and the D1v1s10n 0f State Lands is a v;ilid 
lease, is in full force and effect despite the attempt of the Division of State 
Lands to cancel it, and that the term of the lease is to be extended for a 
period equivalent to that needed to litigate the matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 10, 1980, Robert W. Adkins applied to the Division of State 
Lands for an oil, gas, and hydrocarbon lease on the following described 
property in San Juan County: 
Lots 3, 4, 5, and 6, the south half of the northwest quarter, and 
the south half of Section 2, Township 27 south, Range 20 east, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian. 
The north half of the southeast quarter of Section 8, Township 27 
south, Range 21 east, Salt Lake Base and Meridian 
The application was granted and under date of March 24, 1980, Adkins 
and the division entered into Lease No. ML37794 (R 5, 18) 
On March 25, 1981, the Division of State Lands sent Adkins a letter 
telling him that the 509. 18 acres in Section 2 had previously been withdrawn 
from oil and gas leasing, and therefore that property was being deleted from 
the lease, and he would receive a refund of $1,020 paid in rentals on the 
deleted portion ( R. 18, 22) On May 19, 1981, Adkins wrote to the 
Department of Natural Resources protesting the ;ict10n uf ih D1,·1010n •lf State 
Lands and requesting a hearing ( R 23) 
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On August 12, 1981, the Division of State Lands and Forestry sent a 
lettPr to Adkins telling him 
Please be advised that on August 12, 1981, the Land Board upheld 
the partial cancellation of the above-numbered lease with respect to 
TL7S, R20E, Section 2: Lots 3, 4, 5, 6, S~ NW'-.,, S~, thus 
reiectmg your formal appeal 
Also on August 12, 1981, the Division's Minerals Resource Specialist 
notified Adkms that the land located in Section 8, Township 27 south, 
Range 21 east, SLM, had also been withdrawn, and that he would recommend 
to the Director that the lease be cancelled (R. 70). On August 17, 1981, the 
Dt.rector did cancel the lease, without notifying Adkins of the action (R. 71). 
On October 29, 1981, Adkins wrote to the Division, asking whether the lease 
had m fact been cancelled, and "pursuant to Section 65-1-9" requested a 
hearing ( R 25). 
On February 26, 1982, the Division of State Lands sent the following 
notice to Adkins: 
This letter will serve as notice that the Land Board, on 
November 10, 1981, considered your appeal of the Director's action 
of August 17, 1981, cancelling ML37794 OG&H. 
By unanimous vote of the Land Board, the Director's action was 
upheld. 
Prior to the cancellation of the lease, the rentals were paid timely, and 
subsequent to the cancellation, the rentals were tendered timely by Adkins, 
but they were not accepted by the Division of State Lands. 
Adkins did not file another "protest" with the Division of State Lands or 
with the Board of State Lands, but on February 13, 1982, notified the 
TrP,10ure1· uf the State of Utah that the action of the Board of State Lands 
would be te~ted lil the court Adkins did not file with the Attorney General 
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a notice of his claim that the action of the Division of State Lands was invalid 
and did not file a claim against the State of litah On ,JunP 8, J'l8'.:, he filed 
an action in the District Court of Salt Lake C<Junty w1th"ut f1Jmg an 
undertaking for costs, 
On June 14, 1966, the State Land Board had purported to withdraw from 
oil and gas leasing the property in Section 2, Township 27 sou th, Range 20 
east, covered by the lease with Adkins. At that time there was no statute 
authorizing the State Land Board to withdraw lands from oil and gas leasing. 
Such authority was given later by Chapter 183, Section 4, Laws of Utah 1967 
On June 8, 1967, after authority had been given, the State Land Board 
withdrew the 80 acres lying in Section 8 ( R. 38). 
When the Adkins lease was entered into, the withdrawals were not shown 
on the plat maps maintained by the division (R. 79). 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFF COMPLIED WITH THE "PROTEST" REQUIREMENTS OF 
65-1-9(2) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 PRIOR TO FILING THIS 
ACTION 
The letter from the Division of State Lands dated March 25, 1981, 
informed Adkins that the land lying in Section 2 was being deleted from the 
lease. The letter from the Division dated August 12, 1981, was a 
recommendation to the Director that the lease be cancelled with respect to the 
80 acres as well as the "previously deleted portions," and the recommendation 
was followed by the Director on August 17, 1981 In both mstances Adkins 
protested, and the protests were considered and rejected by the Land Board 
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But the court ruled that he had not complied with the statute because he had 
not protested the Land Board's ruling. 
The statute relied upon by the Division and by the district court is 
65-1-9(2) Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
No claimant for lands under control of the board can appeal 
for judicial review of a decision of the board involving any sale, 
lease, or disposition of state lands, or any action relating thereto, 
unless such claimant files a written protest with respect thereto 
with the board within 90 days after the final decision of the board 
relating to such matter; or, with respect to decisions rendered 
prior to the effective date of this act, within 90 days after such 
effective date. This provision shall not relate to disputes between 
the board and any party as to the ownership or title to any lands. 
The above section was enacted in 1963, when all of the functions relative 
to state lands were under jurisdiction of the State Land Board. The Board 
was responsible for both policy and administration. Of necessity, it 
performed its functions through subordinates -- its staff. Since it is not 
uncommon for administrative staffs to make decisions that are, for all intents 
and purposes, final, it was reasonable to provide for submission of such 
matters to the Board to make certain that the action was Board action before 
permitting resort to the courts. 
The section is not typical of statutes providing for administrative 
review The difference between review and final action by a particular 
agency is pointed out in 2 Arn. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 542: 
An appeal in valves two tribunals, one of which has the power 
to decide in the first instance and the other to review on appeal a 
decision so made, and, dependent upon the applicable statutes and 
the distribution of functions in a particular agency, administrative 
review procedures may or may not possess the attributes of appeals 
in judicial proceedings. Even though a statute provides for an 
"appeal" it has been held that where the purpose of such appeal is 
only to expedite and facilitate the dispatch of business within the 
administrative setup and the officer to whom the appeal lies has the 
power to decide in the first instance and, on his own motion, to 
- 5 -
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order a redetermination where no appeal is take>n. the 1rle>a ,,f :i real 
appeal is excluded and although in form an appeal is JH'e~'"n kd the 
officer exercises original rather than appellatP 1urisclic·t1on 
Were the decisions to JelPte Sec·t1nn ~ .rnd t" CCJnc·d lht· lt·a0<0 "frnal 
decisions" withm the meanmg of fi5-l-9(2l" They certainly hacl the 
appearance of finality. Had Adkins not acted, he would have had no lease 
The fact that the agency action was by letter, rather than formal findings 
with an "order" does not prevent the decision from being final. 
In Mid-Valley Distilling Corp. v. Decarlo, 161 F 2d 485, 488 (3 Cir. 
1947), a supervisor under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act had sent a 
letter to the distilling company, telling it that an attempted transfer of 
permits had resulted in the automatic termination of the permits. The 
company sought judicial review, and the supervisor argued that the letter 
merely informed the company of the automatic termination and was not an 
order. The Court of Appeals held that if the permits did not automatically 
terminate, the letter was an order, and was appealable _ 
As pointed out in 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 585: 
Whether or not a particular administrative determination is an 
"order" or is final is determined by the substance of what the 
agency has purported to do and has done, and not by the label 
placed upon it. The mere informality of a decision does not 
prevent its review if it is otherwise final. Thus, a letter may 
constitute an appealable order or determination. * * * 
It is necessary to consider 65-1-9(2) along with 65-1-1 and 65-1-2 1 
Those subsequently enacted sections did away with the State Land Board and 
distributed its functions to a Division of State Lands and a Board of State 
Lands within the Department of Natural Resources 
65-1-1. Board of state lands -- Creation -- Tran'f'"r "f l"_'\\·er2' 
and duties~ There is created withu1-tFie depar:tn1..,nt ,-,f n.itUI·ai 
resources a board of state lands which, except a, utlwnvise 
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provided m this act, shall assume all of the policy-making 
functions. powers, duties, rights, and responsibilities of the state 
land board, together with all functions, powers, duties, rights, and 
responsibilities granted to the board of state lands by this act. 
The board of state lands shall be the policy-making body of the 
d1v1sion of state lands Except as otherwise provided in this act, 
whenever reference is made in title 65, or in any other provision of 
law, to the state land board, it shall be construed as referring to 
the board of state lands where such reference pertains to 
policy-making functions, powers, du ties, rights and responsibilities; 
but in all other instances such reference shall be construed as 
referring to the division of state lands. 
65-1-2. l. Division of state lands -- Creation -- Power and 
authority. There is created the division of state lands, which 
shall be within the department of natural resources under the 
administration and general supervision of the executive director of 
natural resources and under the policy direction of the board of 
state lands. The division of state lands shall be the state land 
authority for the State of Utah, shall assume all of the functions, 
powers, duties, rights and responsibilities of the state land board 
except those which are delegated to the board of state lands by 
this act and is vested with such other functions, powers, duties, 
rights and responsibilities as provided in this act and other law. 
Within the Department of Natural Resources as reorganized, the Director 
of Natural Resources had a right to make final decisions with respect to 
matters other than those determining policy for the Division of State Lands. 
The actions taken in deleting property from Adkins' leases and in cancelling 
the lease were final decisions by the Director (R. 68, 71), the letters written 
by Adkins in response to those decisions were protests, and the Division 
treated them as protests. 
It is arguable that the Board of State Lands should not have been 
involved at all, because the actions did not involve policy-making, but the 
Board of State Lands purported to act upon them by way of appeal and 
hearing. voting unanimously to uphold the actions of the Director. 
\J nder the holding of the district court, a person involved with the 
Oi\'1s10n <)[' State Lands would be required to file a protest with the Division, 
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obtain a ruling from the Board of State Lands, and protest the Board's 
decision. From a standpoint of administrative procedure or due process this 
does not make sense. Adkins' position w~s calJ,.,<i to Lhe ~llenllon of the 
highest powers in the Department of Natu1·al Resources and those powers 
determined that the action taken by the director should be upheld What 
possibly could be accomplished by a second appeal to the Board of State 
Lands or to the Director of Natural Resources? 
II 
THE GOVERNMENT AL IMMUNITY ACT DID NOT REQUIRE 
PLAINTIFF TO SERVE NOTICE OF HIS CLAIM, TO FILE A CLAIM 
AGAINST THE STATE, OR TO POST AN UNDERTAKING FOR 
COSTS IN ORDER TO HAVE HIS RIGHTS DETERMINED IN THIS 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION. 
The trial court held that Adkins could not maintain the action because he 
had not complied with certain provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act, 
treating the action as one against the state. In doing so, the court 
overlooked the fact that the lawsuit is really aimed at obtaining judicial review 
of administrative action. 
Declaratory judgment actions have long been recognized as suitable for 
that purpose. See 22 Am.Jur.2d, Declaratory Judgments, § 31; and 
26 C. J. S., Declaratory Judgments, § 68. Such an action, premised on the 
claim that an administrative agency has acted outside its authority or 
jurisdiction, is not an action against the state. Wisconsin Fertilizer Assoc ".: 
Karns, 39 Wis. 2d 95, 158 NW2d 294, 297 ( 1968) 
Even if the action is against the state, the r·eyuirements uf the 
Governmental Immunity Act do not apply, recent decisions of this cour·t 
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having recognized that the Governmental Immunity Act applies only to 
governmental functions. In Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 
tiOCi P 2d 1230, 1236 (Utah 1980), this court redefined governmental function, 
oayrng 
We therefore hold that the test for determining governmental 
unmunity is whether the activity under consideration is of such a 
uni4ue nature that it can only be performed by a governmental 
agency or that it is essential to the core of governmental activity. 
Clearly, this new standard broadens governmental liability. 
However, the position is consistent with the plain legislative intent 
in § 65-30-1 ~ ~. , to expand governmental liability. 
In Standiford, the court held that operation of a public golf course was 
not a governmental function, and the rule announced in Standiford has been 
applied consistently since it was handed down in 1980. In Johnson v. Salt 
Lake City Corporation, 629 P. 2d 432 (Utah 1981), the court held that 
operation of a sledding course by Salt Lake City was not a governmental 
function; and in Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 P. 2d 737 (Utah 1982), the 
court held that operation of a sewer system was not a governmental function. 
Although the lands involved in this case happen to be state lands, the 
sale of land and the leasing of land for oil and gas purposes, or for other 
purposes, is not a function that is of such a unique nature that it can only 
be performed by a governmental agency, or one that is essential to the core 
of governmental activity. Ownership of the land is not the criterion. In 
Standiford, Johnson, and Thomas the properties involved were all owned by 
the particular municipality. 
Even assuming that the leasing of land for oil and gas development is a 
guvernmental function for the purposes of the Governmental Immunity Act, 
,\dkmo was not required to comply with the notice provision, claim provision, 
- 9 -
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or cost bond provisions of the act It is provided m 63-30-5 l't:ih Code 
Annotated 1953: 
Immunity from suit of aU go\'ernment entit1e:, io ,,,;i1ved do t•,• 
any contractual obligation and a<'t1un' ,fftomg "ut <Jf c·untr·actu.11 
rights or obligations shall not be subject to the r·eq uiremen ts of 
sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13 or 63-30-19 of this act 
Notice of a claim for injury to person or property is required by 
63-30-11, but that is not what this suit is about, 63-30-12 requires the filing 
of a claim within one year after the cause of action arises; 63-30-13 requires 
the filing of such a claim with political subdivisions; and 63-30-19 requires 
the filing of an undertaking conditioned upon payment by plaintiff of taxable 
costs, None of these provisions governs this case because what plaintiff is 
litigating is essentially a contractual obligation, 
The cases generally recognize that although in a lease there are some 
aspects of conveyance of an estate, a lease is also a contract, and the 
obligations as between the lessor and the lessee are contractuaL See 
Medical-Dental Building Co. of Los Angeles v, Horton and Converse, 
21 CaL 2d 411, 132 P. 2d 457, 462 (1942) 
The New World Dictionary of the American Language (1979) defines 
"lease" as follows: 
A contract by which one party (landlord, or lessor) gives to 
another (tenant, or lessee) the use and possession of lands, 
buildings, property, etc, , for a specified time and for fixed 
payments. 
See also 9 Words and Phrases (Perm Ed ) pp, 427-428, 
The trial court apparently regarded this proceeding as being governed 
by 63-30-6 Utah Code Annotated 1953, which does not elimmat~ the w•t1c·e 
claim, and bond requirements: 
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Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for 
th" recovery of any property real or personal or for the possession 
thereof or to quiet title thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other 
lwn~ thereon or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or secure 
an\· aJiudicat10n touching any mortgage or other lien said entity 
may have or claun on the property involved. 
A state lease is not like the kinds of claims that are described in 63-30-6 
which for the most part, are those arising out of rights not dependent upon 
state action. Here we are considering a written agreement, formally executed 
by the state, and the right of the state to repudiate the agreement. 
III 
THE STATE LAND BOARD'S ATTEMPTED WITHDRAWAL FROM OIL 
AND GAS LEASING OF LANDS IN SECTION 2 WAS INVALID 
BECAUSE IT WAS OUTSIDE THE POWERS OF THE BOARD. 
In 1961, in order to aid the preservation and development of potash 
deposits, the Utah State Legislature, by statute, withdrew certain state lands 
from oil and gas leasing. 
The lands withdrawn included Section 2, Lots 1, 2, 7, 8, and the south 
half of the northeast quarter of Township 27 south, Range 20 east, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. Chapter 155, § 1, Laws of Utah 1961; 65-1-99 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 In 1963 additional lands were withdrawn by legislative 
enactrnen t. Chapter 165, § 1, Laws of Utah 1963; 65-1-104 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. Neither of these statutes withdrew the property in Section 2 
that was included in the Adkins lease, but on June 14, 1966, the State Land 
Board µurpol'ted to withdraw that property from oil and gas leasing. The 
minute~ uf a meeting of the State Land Board of June 14, 1966, contained the 
- 11 -
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The Staff recommended that the balance of Sec 2. l ,ot s 3 :, , b. 
SI;; NW\, SI;; [Township 27 south, Range 20 east Salt L:ike [l;i,,,· and 





and consideration, the B(lclrd und11tm(1u"h p;i2>'.:Jed 
motion made by Mr l!clll'h st'cunded hv 
I move we concur with the Staff's recommendat10n 
As of June 14, 1966, there was no statutory provis10n authorizing the 
state land board to withdraw lands from oil and gas leasing Instead, the 
statutes instructed the state land board to issue mineral leases The 
following provisions are pertinent: 
65-1-18. The state land board may issue mineral leases for 
exploring, developing and producing oil and gas or for prospecting 
and mining purposes, upon any portion of the lands or mineral 
interests of the state. 
65-1-24. The board shall cause all public lands now owned by the 
state, or lands to title to which may hereafter be vested in the 
state, to be classified and registered and thereafter sold or 
leased. * * * 
It was not until 1967 that the legislature conferred upon the State Land 
Board the power to withdraw lands from oil and gas leasing At the time of 
the attempted 1966 withdrawal, the first paragraph of 65-1-45 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 read as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, applications to lease 
shall be considered in the order filed. provided, that when 
simultaneous applications are filed the land board shall let the land 
to the applicant who will pay the highest rental therfor, and 
provided further, that applications to lease land already under lease 
shall not be received before the date following the exµirat10n of 
said lease, and all such applications received on such day shall be 
considered simultaneous. 
By Chapter 183, § 4, Laws of Utah 1%7, thte f,,n·g,,m2,· r;.ir:igrd[•h 
65-1-45 was amended to read as follows 
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Except as otherwise provided herein applications to lease state 
lands for mineral purposes shall be considered in the order in 
which they are filed The division of state lands shall have the 
;iu!h<onty to withdraw state lands from leasing, but unless state 
lands 3re withdrawn and except as otherwise provided herein, the 
divis10n shall lease the land to the first qualified applicant who has 
filt>d dn appllcat10n in accordance with rules and regulations 
promulgated by the board of state lands. 
In light of the history of 65-1-45, it is reasonable to assume that prior 
to the amendment in 1967, the power to withdraw lands from oil and gas 
leasing had not been granted to the State Land Board but had been retained 
by the legislature, and that the Board's action in attempting to withdraw 
certain lands from leasing was invalid. 
In Hirsh v Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co. , 51 Utah 558, 172 P. 318 
( 1918), at issue was whether notice of filing a remittitur had to be given to 
the opposing party. Subsequently, the legislature amended the statute to 
provide for notice. In holding that notice had not been required prior to the 
amendment, the court said: 
As we read the statute, plaintiffs' counsel had a perfect legal 
right to have the remittitur go down and to file the same in the 
district court just as was done. Nor is there anything in the 
statute which required him to serve notice on appellant or its 
counsel that the remittitur had been sent down and filed in the 
district court. That such was the case is, we think, made clear 
from the fact that since this motion was determined in the district 
court the Legislature has amended section 3351, supra (chapter ll5, 
Laws Utah 1917. § 388), by requiring service of notice on the 
adverse party in case a remittitur is sent down as was done in this 
case, and that the time within which the cost bill must be served 
and filed dates from the service of such notice. If service of 
notice had thus been required under the statute as it stood, it 
would have been a useless ceremony to have amended it. Clearly 
the legislative construction was that the old statute did not require 




See also 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 236 
In making material changes in the lang·ucig'° "I .i ~Litutc thP 
legislature can neither be assumed tu have rPgar·de(1 such changPs 
as without significance, nor to have committed an oversight or to 
have acted inadvertently, to the contrary, the general rule is that 
a change in phraseology indicates persuasively, and raises a 
presumption, that a departure from the old law was intended, 
particularly where the wording of the statute is radically 
different. * * * 
IV 
INASMUCH AS APPELLANT WAS THE FIRST APPLICANT, THE 
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS WAS OBLIGATED TO ISSUE TO HIM A 
LEASE ON THE PROPERTY IN SECTION 2. 
The lands in Section 2 had been leased on March 18, 1955, under Oil 
and Gas Lease ML6790, MLA5436. 
The minutes of the State Land Board of June 14, 1966, state that 
"ML6790 was cancelled on February 14, 1966, for non-payment of rental for 
the portion of its term from January 1, 1966, until April 1, 1966." In light 
of the statutory provisions then obtaining, the statement that the lease was 
cancelled is obviously incorrect, and in connection with the motions for 
summary judgment, Adkins filed an affidavit to the effect that he had not 
been able, at the time of the hearing, to obtain affidavits establishing the 
circumstances under which the earlier lease ended. It would appear, 
however, that the lease ended by its own tern\s. 
At the hearing, it was suggested ( R. 136) that the court might take 
notice of the prior lease, and this court may do the same The prior lease 
was issued to Walter L. Morrison on March 15, 1955 lt contained the 
following provision: 
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Sect10n 2 TERMS OF LEASE -- This lease, unless terminated 
at an earlier date as hereinafter provided, shall be for a primary 
term of ten years from and after January 1 next succeeding the 
date of issuance hereof and for so long thereafter as oil or gas or 
either of them are produced in commercial quantities from the leased 
premises 
Thus under the terms of the lease, it was to expire on December 31, 
1965, so there was no "portion of its term from January 1, 1966, until 
April 1, 1966 " As of January 1, 1966, the term had expired and the lease 
therefore was not cancelled by action of the State Land Board. 
At the time the earlier lease expired, 65-1-45 Utah Code Annotated 1953 
provided· 
Except as otherwise provided by law, applications to lease 
shall be considered in the order filed; provided, that when 
simultaneous applications are filed the land board shall let the land 
to the applicant who will pay the highest rental therefor; and 
provided further, that applications to lease land already under 
lease, shall not be received before the day following the expiration 
of said lease, and all such applications received on such day shall 
be considered simultaneous. 
In all cases where lands become available for leasing by the 
state because they are newly acquired or because a previous 
mineral lease is cancelled or otherwise terminated by the board, 
such land shall be offered for mineral lease by the following 
procedure· [Competitive bidding procedures set out.) 
As of June 14, 1966, the competitive bidding provisions did not apply 
because the land was not newly acquired and was not available for ~easing 
because a previous mineral lease had been cancelled or terminated by the 
Board. It was then the obligation of the State Land Board to lease the 
property to the first qualified applicant, or to the one offering the best 
terms. if the applications were filed simultaneously. 
At the tune the lease was entered into with Adkins the land had been 
available for leasing for some 14 years, and it was not necessary for the 
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Division of State Lands to send out notices that the land had become available 
for oil and gas leasing. The availability of the land for !P:ising could have 
been ascertained by any other parly as easily as rt was ascertained by 
Adkins 
v 
THE DIVISION OF STATE LANDS IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING 
THAT LEASE OF THE LANDS TO ADKINS IS INVALID. 
When the Division of State Lands announced to Adkins that the 
properties in Section 2 were being deleted from plain tiff's lease, the only 
basis assigned therefor was that they had been previously withdrawn. In 
neither case did the Division of State Lands make any suggestion to plaintiff 
that the lease was invalid because of the failure of the Board to follow 
competitive bidding (simultaneous offering) procedures. The Division was 
fully aware of this basis for cancelling the lease (R. 68, 71), but nothing was 
said about the procedures in the letters denying Adkins' protests, and 
nothing was said about them in the answer to the complaint in this action 
Adkins acted to his detriment, initiating a lawsuit to test the question of 
whether the Board had power to withdraw the lands included in his lease 
Because of the Board's failure to raise the question of compliance with the 
competitive bidding provisions, plaintiff has incurred great expense, including 
attorney's fees, and the expenditure of time and effort to litigate the question 
of the right of the land board to withdraw the property. The Division should 
not be heard, at this stage of the proceeding, to state that the lease wao 
properly cancelled because of the failure of the Division of State Lands t" 
follow prescribed leasing procedures 
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This court has recognized that in a proper case the doctrine of estoppel 
may be applied against the state. In Utah State University~- Sutro ~Co., 
6.f6 P 2d 71.S, 718-720 (Utah 1982), the court pointed out the necessity of 
estoppmg the state in some instances in order to prevent injustice, 
particularly where the activities involved are not authorized by law, but are 
not inherently evil. 
In the present case the Division of State Lands misled Adkins into 
believing that certain lands were available for leasing, that he was qualified 
to lease them and, finally, that the only basis for challenging the leases was 
that they had been withdrawn. The rights of third persons are not involved, 
the state is engaged in business, and critical questions of public policy are 
not involved. The state therefore should be estopped from asserting the 
invalidity of the lease and the need to follow simultaneous posting procedures. 
CONCLUSION 
Adkins did all that could reasonably be expected of him in protesting the 
action taken by the Division of State Lands. The action taken by the 
Division was final action, and that final action was protested within the time 
required by statute. The protest was duly considered at a hearing before 
the Board of State Lands and the action of the Director with upheld. This 
suit was brought to review that action. 
The selling and leasing of land is not a type of operation uniquely suited 
to performance by a governmental agency, and is not at the core of 
government activity, and therefore Adkins was not required to comply with 
the pnivisions of the Governmental Immunity Act respecting notice of claim, 
filing of claim, and filing of an undertaking for costs. Moreover, even if the 
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leasing of lands is a governmental funct10n. the act10n rnv<dveo a cc•nt r.i<'I 
between Adkins and the Division of Stak Lande .Jfld tht n .. tice. ,·J;nm an,J 
undertaking provisions do not apply 
The State Land Board ill 1966 had no authu1·1tv to wlthdra\\ lands from 
leasing for oil and gas, and the implication from the statutes enacted ill 1961 
is that the legislature itself had decided what lands should be withdrawn from 
oil and gas leasing and included those lands in statutory provis10ns It may 
be assumed that when the legislature gave to the Division of State Lands the 
right to withdraw lands from oil and gas leasing it intended to change the 
statute then in effect. 
Inasmuch as the lands in Section 2 had been available for leasing for 
more than 14 years, it was not necessary for the Division of State Lands to 
follow the competitive bidding procedures presently prescribed by 65-1-45. 
and the lease entered into was valid and enforceable 
The judgment of the district court should be reversed and the case 
remanded with directions to enter a judgment declaring that the lease between 
the Division of State Lands and Robert W. Adkins is valid and in full force 
and effect, and that Adkins is entitled to have the term of the lease extended 
by the length of time required to establish the validity of the leases, subject 
only to his paying the necessary rentals. 
Res~~ully submitted. 
/j·1,c,,-,~~A_ B#Ze~-- --- --
ROE AND FUWLEH 
340 E;1st Fourth s .. uth 
Salt Lakt City. l't;ih .~·tl l l 
Att<n·nty' fur l'Luntilf-,\1,1wll:rnt 
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